VMware vCenter Auth Bypass Exploited per Google (CVE-2026-123890): Patch Now

Rescana advisory card: VMware vCenter authentication bypass (CVE-2026-123890), CVSS 9.8, not in CISA KEV. Patch now.

Status: Broadcom disclosed CVE-2026-123890 on 19 November 2026 in advisory VMSA-2026-0009: an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service of VMware vCenter, scored 9.8 under CVSS 3.1, with no workaround. CVE-2026-123890 is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) says a suspected PRC-nexus actor, tracked as ARMORY CASTLE, used the flaw as a zero-day in early September 2026, more than two months before the patch. Broadcom's own advisory does not say the flaw is exploited. Fixed versions are 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, 8.0 U3m and VCF 5.2.5; vCenter 7.0 has no published fix. We last checked these sources at 15:22 EST on 19 November 2026.

Executive Summary

vCenter Server is the management plane for a VMware virtual environment. It holds the logins, the directory and the single sign-on service that decide who can control every host and virtual machine under it. An attacker who bypasses authentication there does not need to break anything else.

Broadcom's advisory describes the flaw in one sentence: "A malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system." It needs no account and no user interaction. Broadcom credits Mandiant with reporting it.

GTIG's report, "ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere", describes the attack. In its words, "ARMORY CASTLE exploited this vulnerability in early September 2026 using BONESAW, according to forensic evidence." It says the actor moved from a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance to an internal Linux appliance, reached vCenter from there, created its own administrator account and copied the vCenter directory database, the signing key for the SAML token service, the vCenter master key and the PostgreSQL password file. It then moved on to ESXi hosts and copied Windows NTDS and registry files from the disks of virtual machines. We cannot see inside GTIG's investigation, and this is one victim environment, but it shows what a vCenter bypass is worth to a well-resourced attacker.

What to do (Rescana guidance): treat this as an emergency change, as Broadcom's FAQ also says, for every vCenter you run or depend on. Patch to a fixed version, restrict who can reach vCenter's management ports, and, for any vCenter that was reachable from untrusted networks since early September, hunt for the signs listed below before you assume the patch closed the matter. The attacker in GTIG's report kept access through stolen keys and extra accounts, which a patch does not remove.

Technical Information

The flaw. Broadcom's advisory calls it a "vCenter authentication-bypass vulnerability" in the VMware Directory Service. The CVE record, written by Broadcom's VMware team as CVE Numbering Authority, classes it as CWE-288, authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel. The CVSS 3.1 vector is AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H: network reachable, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.

What GTIG adds. GTIG describes CVE-2026-123890 as an "unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure vulnerability" reached over DCE/RPC, the remote procedure call interface of the vCenter directory service (vmdird). GTIG says it exploits predictable timestamp generation in the SRP authentication interface, so the attacker obtains the session key without knowing any password. Successful exploitation gives an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local. GTIG says the exploit works against the rpc_srp_verifier service on TCP port 2012, which it describes as the control interface for vCenter single sign-on. GTIG itself calls vmdird the vCenter Server Directory Service, which fits Broadcom's wording; we read the two as the same flaw described at different depth (Rescana's reading).

Impact. With the administrator session, GTIG says the attacker can run commands and take files through the directory service, including the data.mdb directory database. GTIG says its BONESAW tool can also extract the signing key of the vCenter SAML token service, create a backdoor machine account, forge administrator SAML tokens and assign Global Administrator rights on the vCenter root folder. GTIG says a second tool, SAWSNAKE, then used the stolen key to forge tokens, which it says lets the actor bypass multi-factor authentication and impersonate any user.

Exploitation: who says what. The sources do not agree, so we show each one:

  • GTIG: exploited in early September 2026, against a vCenter that was already patched for the earlier CVE-2026-59309. GTIG says the BONESAW binary carries a build timestamp of 13 July 2026, before CVE-2026-59309 was disclosed on 29 July, but notes that build metadata can be altered. GTIG says BONESAW "achieves full system compromise against vCenter Server 7.x and 8.x appliances". It attributes the activity to a suspected PRC-nexus actor, ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221, and says this intrusion started from a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance: GTIG counts the BeyondTrust zero-day CVE-2026-102764, which we covered earlier, and CVE-2026-123890 as "two zero-days" used "in the course of a single compromise".
  • Broadcom: the advisory and its FAQ describe the vulnerability and the fix. We found no statement in either that the flaw is exploited.
  • CISA: its SSVC entry on the CVE record, timestamped 11:27 EST on 19 November, rates exploitation "none", automatable "yes" and technical impact "total". That rating does not match GTIG's report. We do not know whether CISA had seen the report when it set the rating (Rescana's reading: do not rely on the "none").
  • KEV: CVE-2026-123890 is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. We checked catalog version 2026.11.18, which has 1,786 entries, at 15:22 EST on 19 November 2026. A KEV listing could follow GTIG's report, so check again before you rely on this line.

Related CVE. GTIG says CVE-2026-123890 overlaps with CVE-2026-59309, a vmdir flaw disclosed on 29 July 2026, in that both let an attacker obtain the shared session key without the password, but says they are different bugs reached through different interfaces. Broadcom's FAQ says CVE-2026-123890 "is a new and distinct issue". Patches for the earlier flaw do not cover this one.

PoC status. None of the primary sources we reviewed says a public proof of concept exists. GTIG describes BONESAW as the actor's own utility and does not say it has been released. GTIG says SAWSNAKE is a Go port of a public Python tool for forging vCenter SAML logins; we have not opened that tool and do not name or link it. A search of public GitHub repository names and descriptions at 15:31 EST found none claiming exploit code for this CVE; we opened nothing and link to none. Treat the absence of a public PoC as a limit on what we found, not as a safety margin: GTIG's report describes what the flaw gives an attacker, and the actor already had a working tool.

Other flaws in the same advisory. VMSA-2026-0009 also covers CVE-2026-123891, an SQL injection in SDDC Manager (CVSS 8.1), CVE-2026-123892, an authenticated command injection in SDDC Manager (7.2), CVE-2026-123893, a local privilege escalation in SDDC Manager (6.7) and CVE-2026-123894, a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows (6.7). All need an account or local access. GTIG's report covers only CVE-2026-123890, and neither source says the other four are exploited.

Timeline (EST).

  • Early September 2026: GTIG says ARMORY CASTLE used BONESAW against a vCenter server.
  • 19 November 2026 (no time given): Broadcom publishes VMSA-2026-0009; the CVE record published at 09:02 EST already links to it.
  • 19 November 2026, 09:02 EST: CVE-2026-123890 published in the CVE record.
  • 19 November 2026, 10:17 EST: NVD publishes its entry, status Received.
  • 19 November 2026, 11:27 EST: CISA's SSVC entry on the record, with exploitation "none".
  • 19 November 2026, online by 15:22 EST: GTIG publishes its report (the page's metadata says 19 November; its visible byline says 20 November).

Affected Product Versions

Broadcom's response matrix lists the fixes below for CVE-2026-123890. Patches are cumulative, so a newer build also fixes it.

Product Version Fixed version
vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation or vSphere Foundation 9.1.x.x 9.1.1.0200
vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation or vSphere Foundation 9.0.x.x 9.0.2.0200
VMware vCenter 8.0 8.0 U3m
VMware vCenter 7.0 No fix published; Broadcom says to contact support if you have an extended support contract
vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x 5.2.5, using the asynchronous patching guide, KB 88287
VMware Telco Cloud Platform 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2 vCenter 8.0 U3m, per KB 463116
VMware Telco Cloud Infrastructure 3.0 vCenter 8.0 U3m, per KB 463116

Points to watch:

  • vCenter 7.0. Broadcom's FAQ says vSphere 7 reached end of general support on 2 October 2025 and that customers with extended support should request patches through that process. GTIG says BONESAW works against 7.x appliances. Unsupported versions Broadcom does not list, such as 6.5 and 6.7, should be presumed affected, according to the FAQ.
  • The CVE record and NVD do not list 7.0. Their affected-version data names 9.1, 9.0, 8.0, 5.x and the Telco products only. The CVE record also sets unlisted vCenter versions to "unaffected" by default, so a scanner or ticketing rule built from the CVE or NVD data would mark a 7.0 vCenter as not affected; Broadcom's advisory is the list to use (Rescana's reading).
  • VCF 5.x. The advisory table shows 5.2.5, while Broadcom's FAQ says VCF 5.x customers apply vCenter 8.0 U3m through the asynchronous patching process and update SDDC Manager to 5.2.5. Follow KB 88287 and confirm with Broadcom support. When we checked at 15:30 EST, KB 88287 did not yet list vCenter 8.0 U3m.
  • ESX hosts are not affected, according to the FAQ, and Enhanced Linked Mode does not protect you: the FAQ says the flaw is in vCenter itself.
  • Hosted services. The FAQ says hosted and cloud products receive VMSA information through their own consoles; check yours.

How to Find Your Exposure

  1. Find every vCenter, not only the ones in your inventory. Include those inside VMware Cloud Foundation, Telco Cloud and engineered systems, and those a hosting or managed-service provider runs for you. Broadcom's FAQ says to ask the vendor of any third-party engineered system before patching, because they control their own patch levels (Rescana guidance).
  2. Read the build. Broadcom's FAQ says the build and version appear on the Summary tab of the vSphere Client, and in PowerCLI after Connect-VIServer as $global:DefaultVIServer.Build and $global:DefaultVIServer.Version. Compare against the table above. Broadcom's release notes, all dated 19 November 2026, give the fixed builds: vCenter 9.1.1.0200 is build 25901347, 9.0.2.0200 is build 25901331, and 8.0 U3m (version 8.0.3.01200) is build 25934264.
  3. Check who can reach vCenter. GTIG found the actor scanning for ports 443, 5480 and 2012 and using TCP 2012 for the exploit. Test, from networks that are not administrator workstations, whether those ports and SSH on 22 answer. A vCenter reachable from a general server network was reachable from any compromised server on it (Rescana guidance). Broadcom names no port and says only "network access to vCenter", so do not assume that blocking TCP 2012 alone closes the flaw (Rescana guidance). For example: VC=your.vcenter.address; for p in 443 2012 5480 22; do nc -vz -w3 $VC $p; done.
  4. Set the exposure window. GTIG's evidence starts in early September 2026. For any unpatched vCenter that was reachable since then, keep logs from September onward, and treat the question of compromise as open until you have hunted (Rescana guidance).

Workaround and Mitigation

Patch. Broadcom lists no workaround. Its FAQ says only that other compensating controls, such as perimeter and appliance firewalls, may help and that each organization must decide whether to rely on them. Apply the fixed version for your release (Rescana guidance). Per Broadcom's FAQ:

  • Running virtual machines and containers keep working during a vCenter update; the vSphere Client and other management tools are briefly unavailable, and new encryption operations and key rotations against a Standard Key Provider are unavailable while vCenter is offline.
  • The VAMI can apply the update, and these updates are not eligible for vCenter Quick Patch.
  • vCenter 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 block upgrades to VCF 9.1.1 (a "Back-in-Time" restriction), and Broadcom tells customers who are mid-upgrade to wait for VCF 9.1.2 or weigh their options. Details are in KB 67077. The FAQ also says that customers mid-upgrade can instead move vCenter to 9.1.1 first and apply the fix there.

Limit network reach while you patch (Rescana guidance). Allow only administrator networks and the systems that need it, such as backup servers, to reach vCenter's management ports. GTIG recommends a default-deny inbound policy on the appliance at kernel level, with allowlists, and says dropping TCP 2012 for non-allowlisted addresses stops an exploit payload sent from a compromised appliance from reaching vmdird. Mandiant recommends its VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool, egress filtering and forwarding appliance command and firewall logs to a SIEM, and warns that firewall rules need rigorous testing and change control before production. We have not tested these controls. Broadcom does not list them as a workaround for this CVE, so use them as a stopgap and not as a substitute for the patch. GTIG warns that the appliance's built-in VAMI firewall cannot restrict by port, cannot log denied connections, and can be switched off by anyone who reaches the VAMI.

If you suspect compromise (Rescana guidance). GTIG says the actor took the SAML signing key, the vCenter master key and the database password, so patching does not remove access an attacker already holds. Review SSO and local administrator accounts for any you did not create, review whether SSH was switched on through the VAMI without a change record, and ask Broadcom support how to replace the SAML signing certificate and rotate the vCenter master key and database credentials in your version before you rely on the patched appliance. Review ESXi hosts for unfamiliar root SSH keys, since GTIG says the actor added one, review ESXi Host Client and SSH logins as root or vpxuser from unexpected sources, since GTIG says the actor used both, and rotate credentials stored in or reachable from vCenter. Involve your incident response team before you rebuild, to keep evidence. If you run BeyondTrust Remote Support and it was exposed to CVE-2026-102764, include your vCenters in this hunt even if they were never reachable from outside, because in GTIG's case that appliance was the way in.

Indicators of Compromise

Broadcom's advisory lists no indicators of compromise. The ones below are from GTIG's report and describe one intrusion. GTIG notes that it found an updated sample of at least one tool, so names, paths and hashes can change, and a clean search does not prove a clean vCenter.

Network indicators. GTIG lists these 11 addresses as a "Suspected Obfuscation Network", which it describes as compromised third-party firewalls and routers. Treat them as hunting leads for connections to your vCenter, ESXi hosts and the Linux appliances around them, not as a complete block list (Rescana guidance):

  • 103.147.251.5
  • 103.190.38.3
  • 118.174.128.34
  • 118.174.128.36
  • 118.174.128.38
  • 176.9.89.66
  • 185.71.15.109
  • 220.121.128.41
  • 222.108.77.44
  • 61.216.56.127
  • 81.45.89.43

File indicators. GTIG lists these tools and paths on a Linux appliance next to vCenter:

  • ActiveSer.jsp: a command-execution web shell GTIG calls SLIMSAVAGE.
  • u.jsp: a file-staging web shell GTIG calls CAGEMATCH.
  • /tmp/123: the BONESAW exploitation utility.
  • /tmp/sss: SAWSNAKE, a utility for forging SAML logins.
  • /tmp/dbr: BEARBONES, a backdoor built from the Dropbear SSH server.
  • /tmp/123.key: an SSH private key staged to log in to ESXi.
  • /usr/bin/vmtoolscs: LAZYBONES, a backdoor that takes commands through Slack, with a systemd service set to restart every 50 minutes.

The /tmp/123.key entry comes from GTIG's narrative, not its indicator table.

Behaviour GTIG observed:

  • SSH banner. A listener returning SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_23345, which GTIG says it used to find the actor's obfuscation network.
  • Listener ports. BEARBONES started on TCP port 53 and later TCP 33992.
  • VAMI SSH toggling. A PUT request to /rest/appliance/access/ssh on the vCenter appliance management interface, turning SSH on and later off again.
  • New accounts. A local administrator account on vCenter whose name starts with sps- at @vsphere.local, and, per BONESAW's design, a machine account created in the directory service.
  • ESXi. An added SSH key in root's authorized_keys, a hidden .a directory on a datastore volume, and an unexpected vmfs-pydist.tar.gz.
  • Scanning. nmap sweeps from the compromised Remote Support appliance for ports 443, 2012, 389, 5480 and 9080, with one sweep also covering 445, 3389, 22 and 21.

GTIG's report also contains YARA rules for these tools and names the Google SecOps detections that cover the activity; use the report, not our summary, for detection content.

Third-Party Risk (TPRM) Angle

vCenter sits under many suppliers: hosting and colocation providers, managed service providers, private clouds, telecoms running Telco Cloud, and SaaS companies that run their own virtual infrastructure. If a supplier's vCenter falls, the person who controls it controls the virtual machines that hold your data, and GTIG's account shows the actor reading guest disk files, including Windows NTDS and registry files, from the host side (Rescana guidance).

The risk concentrates in three supplier types:

  • Hosting and managed-infrastructure providers that run VMware for you and manage vCenter themselves.
  • Telecom and network suppliers on VMware Telco Cloud Platform or Telco Cloud Infrastructure, which use the same vCenter fix path.
  • Suppliers still on vCenter 7.0, who have no published fix unless they pay for extended support.

Send these three questions to suppliers that host or process your data on VMware (Rescana guidance):

  1. Which vCenter version and build runs the infrastructure that holds our data, and has it been updated to a fixed version from VMSA-2026-0009?
  2. If you run vCenter 7.0, what is your plan, given that Broadcom has published no fix?
  3. Was vCenter reachable from networks other than administrator workstations at any time since early September 2026, and have you reviewed SSO accounts, VAMI SSH events and ESXi root keys since then?

Ask for evidence, not reassurance: the build number, the date it was patched, and the result of the account and access review. Record the answers against each supplier, and follow up with any that cannot say which vCenter version they run.

What to do internally: find every vCenter, patch to a fixed version, limit management-port access to administrator networks, and hunt for the signs above on any vCenter that was reachable and unpatched since September. We will update this advisory if CISA adds the CVE to KEV or Broadcom or GTIG revises its reporting.

Need help working out which suppliers run VMware infrastructure exposed to CVE-2026-123890? Our team can help you prioritize them and track their answers. Talk to an expert

Sources

Talk to an expert

Talk to Rescana about this advisory — or about how we help TPRM teams keep reviews moving.