Financial-services third-party risk is not a stricter version of a generic vendor program. In the United States, the document examiners actually use is the Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, issued jointly on 6 June 2023 by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC. Each agency published its own cover: OCC Bulletin 2023-17, Federal Reserve SR 23-4, and FDIC FIL-29-2023. In September 2026 the agencies, joined by the NCUA, proposed new guidance that they plan to use to rescind and replace the 2023 text once it is finalized. The proposal is non-binding and open for comment until 16 December 2026; until it is finalized, the 2023 guidance remains the current interagency text. In the EU, a financial entity's ICT third parties sit under DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, applicable since 17 January 2025. The two texts use similar words (criticality, contracts, monitoring, exit) and require different work products. This page is the map between them. The clause-by-clause DORA breakdown stays on the DORA page.
Who the 2023 guidance covers
The guidance says it is relevant to all banking organizations supervised by the three agencies. In practical terms that reaches national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches under the OCC; state member banks and holding companies under the Federal Reserve; and insured state nonmember banks and state savings associations under the FDIC. It is not, by itself, a rule for credit unions, broker-dealers, or insurers that those three agencies do not supervise. A New York-licensed insurer or money transmitter still has a separate third-party duty under 23 NYCRR Part 500. A non-bank financial institution under the FTC's jurisdiction still has the Safeguards Rule's service-provider duty, which is a different GLBA implementation and does not apply to banks; that split is covered on the GLBA page.
Inside that supervised population, scope is wide. The guidance addresses any business arrangement between a banking organization and another entity, by contract or otherwise. A relationship can exist with no contract and no fee. The examples in the text include outsourced services, independent consultants, referral arrangements, merchant payment processing, services from affiliates and subsidiaries, joint ventures, and some fintech structures. A firm that inventories only signed IT contracts has already drawn the population smaller than the agencies did.
It is guidance, and it says so
A footnote in the final text is easy to skip: supervisory guidance does not have the force and effect of law and does not impose any new requirements on banking organizations. The footnote points at each agency's rule on the status of guidance (12 CFR part 4, subpart F, appendix A for the OCC; 12 CFR part 262, appendix A for the Board; 12 CFR part 302, appendix A for the FDIC). Treating the June 2023 document as a clause-level regulation, the way DORA Article 30 is a clause-level regulation, over-reads it. Treating it as optional reading under-reads it. Examiners review third-party risk management as part of ordinary supervision, and the banking organization remains responsible for operating in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with applicable law to the same extent as if it performed the activity in-house. That responsibility is statutory (12 U.S.C. 1831p-1), not a suggestion in a bulletin.
The 2023 guidance replaced the three agencies' older outsourcing bulletins. The Federal Register preamble records the replacements: Federal Reserve SR 13-19 / CA 13-21, FDIC FIL-44-2008, and OCC Bulletins 2013-29 and 2020-10. Two adjacent documents did not disappear. OCC Bulletin 2002-16, on foreign-based third-party service providers, was not rescinded and supplements the 2023 guidance. And FIL-29-2023 withdraws the FDIC's 2016 proposed guidance on third-party lending (FIL-50-2016), because the final interagency text covers lending relationships along with every other kind. On 3 May 2024 the same three agencies published Third-Party Risk Management: A Guide for Community Banks (PDF). OCC Bulletin 2024-11 is explicit that use of the guide is voluntary, that it does not anticipate every relationship, and that it illustrates the 2023 principles rather than adding a new standard. It also points back to the 2021 community-bank guide on due diligence for fintech companies.
Critical activities are the bank's own call
Not every relationship gets the same oversight. The guidance tells a banking organization to keep a complete inventory, to risk-assess each relationship periodically, and to apply more rigorous oversight where the activity is higher-risk, including what it calls critical activities. Characteristics of a critical activity may include an activity that could cause significant risk if the third party fails to meet expectations, that could have significant customer impacts, or that could have a significant impact on the banking organization's financial condition or operations. The bank decides which of its activities meet that description. The text says outright that an activity critical for one banking organization may not be critical for another, and that some firms score every relationship while others identify critical activities and then the third parties that support them. Either method is acceptable. What is not acceptable is having no methodology. That designation is the same judgment vendor tiering exists to record, with an examiner who will ask for the methodology rather than for a particular tier name.
The life cycle the agencies describe
Effective third-party risk management "generally follows a continuous life cycle." The stages, in the guidance's own names, are planning, due diligence and third-party selection, contract negotiation, ongoing monitoring, and termination. The examples under each stage are illustrations, and the text says they may not apply to every relationship. A policy that pastes all of them onto every vendor has ignored the tailoring instruction. The useful reading is: decide, in the planning stage, which of those examples apply to this relationship, and be able to show that decision.
| Stage | What the guidance treats as the point of the stage |
|---|---|
| Planning | Understand the risk before signing. Higher-risk activities, including critical activities, typically warrant more planning. The arrangement's structure matters: who faces the customer, and how much direct control the bank is giving up. |
| Due diligence and third-party selection | Scope the diligence to the risk. Where it is relevant, review the third party's risk management and audits, and consider whether a SOC report or other certification actually covers the activity to be performed. |
| Contract negotiation | A standard vendor paper is a starting point. For higher-risk activities the bank should be able to show it negotiated the points that matter, including audit rights, compliance responsibility, subcontracting, and termination. |
| Ongoing monitoring | Confirm the third party still meets its obligations, escalate material deterioration, and respond. Monitoring may be periodic or continuous, and it should get more frequent as risk rises. Both the level and the type of risk can change over the life of the relationship. |
| Termination | Leave in an orderly way: an alternate provider or an in-house option, the cost of exit, data retention and destruction, access removal, and the customer impact if the third party is the one that failed. |
Governance sits across the stages rather than inside one of them. The board has ultimate oversight, sets risk appetite, and approves policies. Management builds the process, staffs it, and escalates significant issues. Periodic independent reviews test whether the process actually identifies and controls the risk, including whether conflicts of interest are avoided when third parties are selected. Documentation the agencies say they have observed in effective programs includes a current inventory of all third-party relationships (and, where the risk warrants it, related subcontractors), the risk assessments, the diligence, the contracts, remediation, monitoring reports, incident notices from third parties, independent-review results, and periodic board reporting. That board pack is also where the guidance expects, as applicable, a view of dependency on a single provider for multiple activities. That is concentration risk written as a reporting item, not as a separate regulation.
SOC reports, subcontractors, and the contract
On SOC reports the guidance is permissive and specific. In due diligence, a banking organization may consider reviewing System and Organization Control reports, and any conformity assessment or certification against relevant standards, and should consider whether the scope and the results are relevant to the activity or instead suggest that the third party or its contractors need more scrutiny. In the contract section, a right-to-audit discussion lists the kinds of reports a contract often entitles the bank to receive, with SOC reports and PCI compliance reports as examples, and says the contract may also reserve the bank's right to audit the third party itself or through an independent party. A SOC 2 whose scope does not cover the service the bank uses is not the evidence the guidance is describing. How to read scope, Type I versus Type II, and complementary user entity controls is covered in SOC 2 in vendor assessment; the PCI side of the same evidence problem is covered in PCI DSS and third-party risk.
Subcontracting gets a contract section because the bank has no direct relationship with the subcontractor and therefore less control, which matters most when the activity is higher-risk. The text walks through notice before a subcontractor is used, a right to prohibit specific subcontractors, consent before assignment, the third party's liability for its subcontractors, and a right to terminate if subcontracting breaks the contract. That is fourth-party risk as a negotiation list. It is not DORA's regulatory technical standard, which tells an EU financial entity what it must assess before a critical or important ICT service is subcontracted.
Two further contract points are easy to leave out of a generic vendor template. For foreign-based third parties, the guidance says to think about choice of law, whether a foreign court will enforce the contract, and privacy and cross-border information rules, which is why the older OCC Bulletin 2002-16 still sits alongside the 2023 text. And for relevant relationships, the contract should state that the third party's performance is subject to regulatory examination, including access to documentation. The citation in the guidance is 12 U.S.C. 1867(c)(1) and 12 U.S.C. 1464(d)(7)(D).
The duties that are actually binding
The principles document is not the only text a US banking organization has to meet. Four neighboring duties have legal force, and each is narrower than the 2023 guidance's "any business arrangement."
- Safety and soundness. 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1, implemented in the interagency safety-and-soundness guidelines, is the statute the 2023 guidance hangs on. The activity must be safe and sound whether or not a third party performs it.
- Customer-information service providers. The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, issued under GLBA sections 501 and 505, include a section titled "Oversee Service Provider Arrangements." The OCC text is 12 CFR part 30, appendix B; the Board and the FDIC maintain parallel appendices. A service provider here is not every vendor. It is a person or entity that maintains, processes, or is otherwise permitted access to customer information or consumer information through services it provides directly to the bank. For those providers the bank shall exercise appropriate due diligence in selection, require by contract that the provider implement measures designed to meet the guidelines' objectives, and, where the risk assessment says so, monitor the provider, including by reviewing audits, summaries of test results, or equivalent evaluations. The Board and the FDIC adopted the same interagency guidelines in their own appendices, for the institutions they supervise.
- Bank Service Company Act notice and examination. When a depository institution causes services authorized under the Bank Service Company Act to be performed for it, by contract or otherwise, 12 U.S.C. 1867(c) does two things. The performance is subject to agency examination to the same extent as if the institution did the work itself on its own premises, and the institution shall notify each appropriate federal banking agency of the service relationship within thirty days after the contract is made or the service is performed, whichever comes first. That is a filing clock, not a risk score. It does not apply to every vendor the bank pays. It applies to services the Act covers.
- Computer-security incident notification. The interagency rule at 12 CFR part 53 (OCC), 12 CFR part 225, subpart N (Board), and 12 CFR part 304, subpart C (FDIC), with compliance required since 1 May 2022, reaches the vendor directly. Under 12 CFR 53.4 and its parallels, a bank service provider must notify each affected banking-organization customer as soon as possible once it determines that a computer-security incident has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to materially disrupt or degrade, covered services for four or more hours. The bank then has 36 hours from its own determination to notify its primary federal regulator of a notification incident. This is the one duty in this list that falls on the vendor itself, so name the bank-designated point of contact in the contract.
A program that "complies with the interagency guidance" and cannot show the Appendix B contract-and-monitor steps for providers that touch customer information, or the 30-day notice where 1867(c) applies, has done the principles and missed the rules.
Where DORA asks for something else
DORA binds financial entities in the EU: banks, insurers, investment firms, payment and e-money institutions, and the other categories listed in the regulation. It does not bind a US banking organization merely because that organization uses a European technology vendor. It does bind an EU subsidiary that is itself a financial entity. The practical differences from the 2023 guidance are the ones that change the file:
| 2023 interagency guidance | DORA Chapter V | |
|---|---|---|
| Legal character | Supervisory principles. The text says they are not new requirements. | A regulation, applicable since 17 January 2025. Chapter V specifies the work. |
| Which relationships | Any business arrangement, with or without a contract. | ICT third-party arrangements. Not every vendor the entity uses. |
| Criticality | The bank defines critical activities and applies more rigorous oversight. Same legal regime either way. | "Critical or important functions" trigger extra contract clauses, a documented and periodically tested exit strategy (Article 28(8)), and advance notice to the competent authority. |
| Inventory | A current internal inventory, subcontractors where risk warrants, used for oversight and board reporting. | A Register of Information for every ICT arrangement, kept at entity and group level and reported to the competent authority. |
| Contracts | Points to weigh. A standard contract can be acceptable when the risk is low. | Article 30 lists key contractual provisions, with an additional set for critical or important functions. |
| Subcontracting | Notice, consent, liability, and termination, written into the contract where the risk warrants them. | Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/532 specifies what must be assessed before subcontracting an ICT service that supports a critical or important function. |
| Exit | A termination stage once the relationship is ending: transition, data, access. | For a critical or important function, an exit strategy and exit plan that are documented and periodically tested (Article 28(8); Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773, Article 10). See vendor offboarding. |
A group with a US bank and an EU financial-entity subsidiary does not pick one column. The US banking organization runs the interagency life cycle, including for affiliates and subsidiaries when those are the third party. The EU entity runs DORA, including the register. Shared providers should be recognizable in both records. The US parent does not become a DORA financial entity by owning one, and the EU entity does not satisfy DORA by pointing at the parent's OCC-style policy.
Turning both into one operating program
- Inventory the business arrangements, not only the contracts. Referrals, affiliate services, and unpaid relationships are in the 2023 scope. Mark which of them also touch customer information (Appendix B) and which are covered bank services (the 30-day notice).
- Write down the criticality method and use it to decide how much of the life-cycle detail applies. Do not maintain a second, informal list for "vendors we worry about."
- Separate evidence from attestation. A SOC report is useful when its scope matches the activity. A certification the guidance would recognize still has to be read against the service the bank actually uses. See evidence-based risk scoring.
- Monitor at the frequency the risk supports. The guidance allows periodic or continuous monitoring and expects the frequency to move when the risk moves. See continuous vendor monitoring.
- Put subcontractors, examination access, and an exit path in the contracts that warrant them, and keep the DORA Article 30 list as a separate addendum for ICT contracts of the EU entity rather than forcing that list onto every US relationship.
- Treat the TPRM utility as a third party. A footnote in the guidance says that when a banking organization uses a third-party assessment service or utility, that arrangement is itself a business arrangement and belongs in the third-party risk process. The firm that scores your vendors is one of your vendors.
Where tooling fits, including the tool itself
The record the agencies describe (inventory, diligence, contracts, monitoring reports, board packs) is the workflow governance platforms such as OneTrust and ProcessUnity are built to hold. Outside-in signal from providers such as BitSight, SecurityScorecard, and UpGuard can feed the ongoing-monitoring stage, which the guidance allows to be continuous where the risk justifies it. Rescana keeps that monitoring and the supporting evidence on the same vendor record, so a review starts from current signal. What it acts on stays under your approval. Whoever the provider is, the 2023 footnote still applies: the assessment service is a third-party relationship of the bank, and it belongs in the same inventory, the same criticality method, and the same contract review as any other arrangement.
Frequently asked questions
What does the 2023 interagency third-party guidance require a bank to do?
The Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, issued on 6 June 2023 by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC, is supervisory guidance. A footnote in the final text says it does not have the force and effect of law and does not impose any new requirements. What it does describe is a continuous life cycle: planning, due diligence and third-party selection, contract negotiation, ongoing monitoring, and termination, with board oversight, independent review, and documentation. The degree of work is supposed to match the risk of each relationship. Binding duties sit next to it rather than inside it, including safety and soundness under 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1, the service-provider section of the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, the bank service provider notification requirement of the computer-security incident notification rule (12 CFR 53.4 and its parallels: a provider must notify the bank when an incident has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to, covered services for four or more hours; separately, the bank has 36 hours from its own determination to notify its regulator of a notification incident), and, for covered bank services, the examination and 30-day notice provisions of the Bank Service Company Act at 12 U.S.C. 1867(c).
Does the OCC third-party guidance apply only to critical vendors?
No. OCC Bulletin 2023-17 and the joint guidance say the principles are relevant to all third-party relationships. Not every relationship receives the same oversight. The bank identifies its own critical activities, meaning activities that could cause significant risk if the third party fails to meet expectations, that could have significant customer impacts, or that could significantly affect the bank's financial condition or operations. Those relationships, and other higher-risk ones, get more rigorous oversight. An activity that is critical for one bank may not be critical for another.
How is DORA different from US bank third-party risk guidance?
DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, is a binding regulation for EU financial entities and has applied since 17 January 2025. Its Chapter V prescribes ICT third-party controls: a Register of Information, specified contract clauses, a pre-contract concentration assessment, subcontracting assessments for critical or important functions, and exit strategies for those relationships that are documented and periodically tested. The 2023 US interagency guidance is principles-based, says it imposes no new requirements, and covers any business arrangement rather than only ICT services. A US banking organization is not subject to DORA merely because it uses a European vendor. An EU subsidiary that is a financial entity is subject to DORA even if its parent follows the US guidance.
Does a SOC report satisfy a bank's third-party due diligence?
Not by itself. The 2023 guidance says a banking organization may consider SOC reports and other certifications during due diligence, and that it should consider whether the scope and the results are relevant to the activity being performed. A report on a different system, or a point-in-time Type I report offered as evidence of operating effectiveness, does not answer the question the guidance is posing. The contract discussion treats SOC reports and PCI compliance reports as examples of artifacts the bank may be entitled to receive, alongside a reserved right for the bank to audit. The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards separately expect the bank, where its risk assessment indicates, to review audits or equivalent evaluations of service providers that touch customer information.
Which institutions does the 2023 interagency third-party guidance cover?
Banking organizations supervised by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, or the OCC. Each agency issued the same guidance under its own cover: SR 23-4, FIL-29-2023, and OCC Bulletin 2023-17. It does not by itself cover credit unions, broker-dealers, or insurers those agencies do not supervise. State regimes can still apply on top: a New York covered entity has Section 500.11 of 23 NYCRR Part 500 whether or not it is a federally supervised bank. EU financial entities follow DORA for ICT third parties. The May 2024 community-bank guide is a voluntary illustration of the 2023 principles, including for banks that are not community banks, and it is not a separate requirement.