A water utility, a transmission operator, and a port authority do not buy software the way a SaaS company does. The expensive, long-lived assets sit on operational technology (OT) networks - controllers, SCADA servers, protection relays - and most of them are installed, configured, and maintained by outside parties who may hold standing remote access. Add the ordinary IT estate (email, ERP, cloud, managed security) and the third-party attack surface is both wider and harder to swap out than in most industries. This page covers how the main regimes frame that risk and how to build a program around it. For the general method, start with what TPRM is and vendor tiering.
What counts as critical infrastructure
The definition depends on the jurisdiction. In the US, CISA recognizes 16 critical infrastructure sectors, among them energy, water and wastewater, transportation, communications, healthcare, financial services, and chemical. In the EU, the NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 lists "sectors of high criticality" in Annex I - energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, waste water, digital infrastructure, ICT service management, public administration, and space - and a second tier of "other critical sectors" in Annex II. Which regime applies to you, and which entity class you fall into, decides the vendor obligations below; the sector name alone does not.
Why OT suppliers break the standard playbook
Four things make critical infrastructure vendor risk different in practice, and each one weakens a habit that works fine for ordinary IT vendors:
- You often cannot leave. A protection relay or a control system is a decades-long commitment. The vendor's security failures become your problem for the life of the asset, so "terminate and replace" is rarely a realistic remediation. Risk acceptance, compensating controls, and contract leverage at renewal matter more than they do for a replaceable SaaS tool.
- Patching is a negotiation, not a policy. Updating firmware on a live process can mean an outage window, vendor sign-off, or re-certification. A vendor's published vulnerability and patch-qualification practice is a better predictor of your exposure than a generic control questionnaire.
- Remote access is the real perimeter. Integrators and equipment vendors frequently keep persistent remote paths into OT for support. Who holds them, how they are authenticated, whether sessions are brokered and logged, and whether they are revoked when a contract ends (see vendor offboarding) is often the highest-value question in the whole assessment.
- Visibility is partial. Much of what matters sits on networks that are deliberately not internet-facing. Outside-in techniques see the vendor's internet-exposed IT footprint; they say little about its OT product security, its build pipeline, or the segmentation of the site it is working on. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, the guide to operational technology security, is the usual reference for what good looks like on the OT side.
What the main regimes expect of vendors
NIS2 (EU)
Article 21(2)(d) lists "supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers" among the minimum risk-management measures. Article 21(3) adds that entities must take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each direct supplier and the overall quality of the supplier's products and cybersecurity practices, including its secure development procedures. Article 22 lets the NIS Cooperation Group, with the Commission and ENISA, carry out coordinated security risk assessments of specific critical ICT supply chains - results that Article 21(3) expects entities to factor in. Under Article 23, a significant incident triggers an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware, an incident notification within 72 hours, and a final report within one month of the incident notification; the 24- and 72-hour clocks generally run from your awareness whether the root cause sits inside your estate or at a supplier. Entities identified as critical under the separate Critical Entities Resilience Directive (EU) 2022/2557 are also treated as essential entities under NIS2. We go clause by clause in NIS2 and the supply chain.
NERC CIP-013 (North American bulk electric system)
For owners and operators of the bulk electric system, NERC CIP-013 (Cyber Security - Supply Chain Risk Management) requires a documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan for high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems (and, under CIP-013-2, the version in force since 1 October 2022, their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems), a requirement to implement that plan, and a review of it at least every 15 calendar months. The plan must cover how risks are identified and assessed during procurement, and it must address specific vendor-facing topics: vendor notification of incidents, coordinated response, notice when vendor personnel no longer need access, disclosure of known vulnerabilities, verification of software integrity and authenticity, and coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access. Note what the standard does not ask for: it governs your process and your procurement, not a certificate the vendor holds. Auditors typically look for evidence that you applied the plan to each purchase, which is an argument for keeping assessment records tied to specific contracts rather than to a vendor in general. CIP-013-3, approved by FERC in March 2026, takes effect on 1 July 2028, and NERC is drafting further revisions in response to FERC Order No. 912, so check NERC's standards page for the version that applies on your audit date.
CIRCIA (US)
The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 directs CISA to require covered entities in critical infrastructure sectors to report covered cyber incidents within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours. Those duties are not yet in effect: under the Act they start on dates set in CISA's final rule, which had not been published at the time of writing. The detailed scope also depends on that rule: the April 2024 proposed rule would treat unauthorized access facilitated through a compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service provider, or other third-party data hosting provider, or through a supply chain compromise, as a substantial cyber incident, alongside operational disruption from any cause. Because the final rule's timing and text have moved, check CISA's CIRCIA page for the current status before you build a process around specific thresholds. The practical point holds either way: if a vendor incident can start your reporting clock, you need contract terms that make the vendor tell you fast, and a way to learn of it when they do not.
A workable program
- Tier by operational consequence, not spend. A small integrator with standing remote access to a control network can matter more than a large IT vendor. Add "can it affect safety or process continuity?" to the tiering criteria alongside data sensitivity.
- Inventory remote access paths per vendor. Map every persistent and on-demand route into OT, who owns it, and when it was last reviewed.
- Split the assessment in two. Assess the vendor as a company (IT posture, incident handling, subcontractors) and assess the product and the service delivery (secure development, vulnerability disclosure, patch qualification, SBOM availability). Questionnaires and certificates cover part of the first and little of the second; on-site review, contract terms, and engineering conversations cover the rest.
- Write incident clauses to your regulator's clock. If you owe a 24-hour early warning under NIS2 or a 72-hour report elsewhere, the vendor's notification duty should usually be materially shorter, and it should name the contact channel. See incident response and SOAR for vendor events.
- Watch for shared dependencies. Several operators relying on one equipment vendor, one remote-support platform, or one cloud region is a sector-level exposure - see concentration risk and fourth-party risk.
- Monitor between assessments. Annual reviews miss a newly exposed vendor service or a freshly disclosed vulnerability. Continuous monitoring of what a vendor exposes to the internet closes that gap for the IT side of the relationship.
Where tools fit, and where they do not
No single product covers this. Security-rating providers such as BitSight and SecurityScorecard give an outside-in view of internet-visible posture across large vendor lists, which is useful for triage and for spotting change. Workflow and GRC platforms such as OneTrust and ProcessUnity are strong at contract, questionnaire, and evidence-tracking process, which is where CIP-013 and NIS2 audit trails live. Rescana focuses on continuous, evidence-based assessment of the vendor's externally observable footprint (see vendor attack surface monitoring), which suits the IT-facing half of a critical infrastructure vendor estate. It does not see inside a vendor's OT product security or a segmented site, and neither does any outside-in method; that half still needs engineering review, contractual controls, and, for the highest tier, on-site assurance. Dedicated OT security tooling addresses the network-level visibility problem separately.
Frequently asked questions
What does NIS2 require for supply chain security in critical infrastructure?
NIS2 Article 21(2)(d) lists supply chain security, including security-related aspects of relationships with direct suppliers and service providers, among the minimum cybersecurity risk-management measures for essential and important entities. Article 21(3) requires entities to take into account vulnerabilities specific to each direct supplier, the overall quality of the supplier's products and cybersecurity practices including secure development, and the results of any coordinated supply chain risk assessments carried out under Article 22. Incident reporting under Article 23 (24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification, final report within one month of the incident notification) applies to the entity even when the cause is a supplier.
What does NERC CIP-013 require for vendors?
NERC CIP-013 requires responsible entities with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems to develop, implement, and review at least every 15 calendar months a supply chain cyber security risk management plan; the version in force, CIP-013-2, also covers their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS), and CIP-013-3 takes effect on 1 July 2028. The plan must address how cyber risks are identified and assessed in procurement and must cover vendor notification of incidents, coordinated response, notice when vendor personnel no longer need access, disclosure of known vulnerabilities, verification of software integrity and authenticity, and coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access. The standard regulates the entity's process rather than certifying the vendor.
Does CIRCIA cover cyber incidents that start at a vendor?
Once CISA's final rule takes effect, CIRCIA will require covered critical infrastructure entities to report covered cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours. Those duties are not yet in effect: the Act ties them to dates set in the final rule, which had not been published at the time of writing. CISA's April 2024 proposed rule would count unauthorized access facilitated through a compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service provider, or other third-party data hosting provider, or through a supply chain compromise, as a substantial cyber incident, and would also cover operational disruption whatever its cause. Confirm the final scope and timing on CISA's CIRCIA page; in the meantime it is prudent to assume a vendor incident could start your own reporting clock.
How is third-party risk different in operational technology environments?
OT suppliers are harder to replace, patch cycles depend on outage windows and vendor qualification, persistent vendor remote access is often the main route into control networks, and much of the relevant environment is not internet-facing, so outside-in scanning sees only part of it. Assessment therefore has to cover the vendor's product security and service delivery (secure development, vulnerability disclosure, patch qualification, remote access controls) as well as its corporate IT posture, using engineering review and contract terms alongside questionnaires and monitoring.
Can automated vendor monitoring or security ratings cover critical infrastructure suppliers?
Partly. Outside-in monitoring and security ratings are useful for the internet-visible part of a supplier's footprint and for detecting change between assessments, but they cannot observe OT product security, build practices, or the segmentation of an operational site. For critical infrastructure they work best as one input alongside contractual controls, remote-access reviews, and engineering or on-site assurance for the highest-impact vendors.